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FOREWORD: SOCIAL PRACTICES, LEGAL NARRATIVE,
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL
TRADITION
LAURENT MAYALI*
"In America the Law is king." Thus spoke Thomas Paine when
asked to define the nascent American republic at a time when its legit-
imacy could at best be considered the improbable result of a revolu-
tionary process that had sounded the death knell of the existing legal
and political order. Paine's self-conscious representation of the young
state reflected, as R. Ferguson has noted, "[T]he centrality of law in
the birth of the republic. .. ."I Despite the revolutionary outcome of
this American genesis, Paine's claim was not surprising. It was the
product of a legal tradition which can be traced back beyond the Mid-
dle Ages to its Roman roots, a tradition that long ago associated the
authority of the law with the exercise of political power.
In his successful attempt to revive the long-lived Roman legal tra-
dition, the emperor Justinian presented himself as the living law on
earth (lex animata in terris).2 Justinian's daring claim would not be
forgotten. Centuries later, medieval lawyers used it to justify the sov-
ereign prerogatives of ambitious feudal princes who wished to
strengthen their new puissance.3 By then, the combination of law and
power, as expressed in the concepts of imperium and jurisdictio,4 had
given rise to an auspicious political discourse.5 The significance of this
timely development, however, was far from obvious to all medieval
people. For once, the Roman law did not provide a clear and func-
tional definition of the state. Moreover, the feudal society was organ-
ized along principles of personal solidarity and private interest which
largely ignored the notion of public sovereignty. It was, therefore, es-
* Professor of Law and Director of the Robbins Religious and Civil Law Collection, Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley School of Law.
1. R. Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture, Cambridge Mass. 1984, pp. 11-33.
2. Corpus iuris civilis, Novella, Nov. 123.
3. L. Mayali, Lex animata, rationalisation du pouvoir politique et Science juridique (XIIe-
XIVe siecle), Re naissanc edu pouvoir a legislatif et genese de l'Etat, Montpellier 1998, pp. 155-
165.
4. For further discussion of this question, see P. Costa, lurisdictio: semantica del potere
politico nella pubblicistica medievale (1100-1433), Milan 1969.
5. J. Vallejo, Ruda equidad, ley consumada. Concepcion de la potestad normativa (1250-
1350), Madrid 1992, pp. 40-49.
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sential for the princes' counselors to trace the origin of the preroga-
tives of their royal patrons to the preexistent Roman law.6 In this
process, Justinian's legacy was somewhat transformed. Included in the
formula-the king was the law-was the belief that, likewise, the law
was king.
In Thomas Paine's view, the legitimacy of the new political order
was founded upon a conception that the state was the ultimate out-
come of the legal reason and its corollary, the rule of law. By the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, the concept of Staatsrecht had
become a significant element of Western political culture. Set at the
nexus of both the legal and political orders, it instituted a normative
space where a given society could be organized according to principles
that authenticated its identity and guaranteed its legitimacy. Nowa-
days, this forceful juridical emphasis is one of the most distinctive at-
tributes of the modern state. According to this model of government,
the state and the law appear to be intrinsincally bound to one another;
they share a common political fate. But the significance of this model
expands its consequences beyond the initial institutional paradigm;
the concept of the legitimate state, as the ideal form of political organ-
ization, defines also a way of personal life and a mode of social behav-
ior that confirms mankind's unique place in the natural order.7 In
other words, the Staatsrecht became a metaphor for the unique char-
acter of a human society that, as noted long ago by Cicero, may claim
its superiority over the violent chaos of the animal world.8
This view had practical implications. By 1900, when the first inter-
national congress of comparative law took place in Paris, it was clear
that civilized nations shared the same legal heritage. Furthermore, this
common background was not affected by the division between the
common law system and the civil law system. Lawyers from both legal
traditions could easily agree with Oliver Wendell Holmes on the exist-
ence of universal and civilized legal principles. In the civil law system,
statutory legislation came to be viewed as the expression of human
reason as reflected by the ancient Roman imperial wisdom. The vari-
ous preambles studied by M.T. Figen show the permanence of this
6. F. Calasso, I Glossatori e la teoria della sovranita: studio di diritto comune pubblico,
Milan 1951, 224 pp.
7. Aristotle, Politics, I, ii, 1258a.
8. Cicero, De Oratore, I, viii, pp. 33-34: "To come, however, at length to the highest
achievements of eloquence, what other power could have been strong enough either to gather
scattered humanity into one place, or to lead it out of its brutish existence in the wilderness up to
our present condition of civilization as men and as citizens, or, after the establishment of social
communities, to give shape to laws, tribunals and civic rights?"
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belief from the Roman empire up to the contemporary European
Union. 9 Under rhetorical language, these introductions reveal the
constant concern of their authors to define their own position as com-
munity leaders. Roman emperors such as Justinian often claimed that
the superior ambition of leadership was best expressed in the exercise
of its legislative power.10 Diocletian's concerns with the financial
prosperity and monetary stability of the empire led him to enact a
series of regulations on prices. But the emperor's edict was more than
a detailed set of technical rules; it also illustrated the crucial role of
the law in safeguarding the Roman humanitas. In Fogen's words, a
comparable "sense of ever-lasting cultural identity" is found in the
heated debates opposing the French revolutionaries. By then, how-
ever, the democratic conception of legislation as the expression of the
people's will had achieved a fusion of law and national identity in the
collective consciousness, and preambles became superfluous. Yet this
form of national self-confidence did not last long. The tragic events of
the twentieth century shattered the indulgent confidence of the Euro-
pean states, and, as a result, preambles were once again needed.
Although there is nothing in common between Nazi statutes and the
regulations of the European Union, both share the same predilection
for preambles. Eventually, however, people knew on which side man-
kind's future stood. Were they to forget, new preambles to new stat-
utes would refresh their memory.
The conception of a civilized world as a world ruled by law was
perhaps essential to defining the identity of Western society." This
unique phenomenon appears at the end of the eighteenth century and
is fully developed in the following century. However, its roots lie in a
legal reason born from the ideas of legal scholars in the last centuries
of the Middle Ages. Although this medieval legal renewal did not
instantly produce a complete legal system, it was the product of a sci-
entific revolution that provoked the development of a legal conscious-
ness and its expansion into other cultural fields. 12 At the beginning of
the twelfth century-a period during which the intriguing Roman
legal sources draw the attention of a handful of jurists-medieval legal
9. M.T. Fdgen, The Legislator's Monologue, 70 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1593 (1995).
10. Justinian's Institutes, prooemium, "Imperial majesty should not only be graced with
arms but also armed with laws, so that good government may prevail in time of war and peace
alike." ed. P. Krueger, Berlin 1893, trans. P. Birks and G. McLeod, Cornell University press,
1987.
11. For further discussion of the dualism of civilization-civil Law, see P. Legendre, Les en-
fants du texte: etude sur la fonction parentale des etats, Paris 1992, p. 65 ff.
12. E. Cortese, I1 rinascimento giuridico medievale, Roma 1992, 141 pp.
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thought was still limited by its methods and objectives. 13 In this vac-
uum, usages and traditional customs 14 formed a normative system that
provided the tool for regulation of daily life. 15 Altogether, this newly
rediscovered Roman law was baffling; it conveyed the components of
a legal culture which the medieval people could not understand. Dur-
ing its long history, Roman law had gradually achieved a high level of
casuistic reasoning that had altered, in many ways, the representation
of the real and physical world.' 6 This special combination of a prag-
matic approach to social issues with sophisticated legal argumentation
explains why the Roman jurists were able to formulate, over several
centuries, sensible solutions to the needs of a changing society. In this
process, most of the aspects of public and private life were being ad-
dressed and framed within an authoritative legal structure.17 Such a
process of juridification has been observed by C. Paulus'8 and D.
Johnston 19 in the spheres of family relationships and business and so-
cial relations, respectively.
The family, which was considered the foundation of Roman soci-
ety since its origins, commanded special attention. Over a period of
several centuries, the relationship between parents and children had
undergone some fundamental changes. In rural Rome, absolute pa-
ternal power had been the fundamental principle of family govern-
ance. But in the late republic, Rome expanded its boundaries to the
edge of this known world. The resulting transformation of an autar-
chic agricultural market into a complex economy based on interna-
tional trade and financial transactions provoked a new distribution of
riches and power. New opportunities arose along with different social
values. As a result, family traditions were increasingly challenged and
social norms were ultimately unable to prevent the collapse of the an-
cestral model. Such a threat was met with a legal response. Con-
13. H. Kantorowicz, Studies in the Glossators of the Roman Law, Cambridge 1938, 323 pp.
14. See for instance, the use of the "convenientia" in Southern France and Northern Italy,
P. Ourliac, La convenientia, in Etudes d'histoire du droit medieval, Paris 1979, vol. 1, pp. 245-254
and G. Nicolaj, Cultura e prassi di notai preirneriani. Alle origine del rinascimento giuridico. (Ius
nostrum. Studi e testi pubblicati dall'istituto di storia del diritto italiano dell'universitA di Roma),
Milan 1991, pp. 40-57.
15. On the distinction between law and norm, see F. Ewald, Michel Foucault et la norme, in
Fremde der Gesellschaft: historische und sozialwissenschasaftliche Untersuchungen zur Differ-
enzierung von Normalitlt und Fremdheit, (lus Commune, Sonderhefte 56), Francfort am Main
1991, pp. 1-16.
16. F. Schulz, History of Roman legal science, Oxford 1946, 358 pp.
17. A. Watson, The Spirit of Roman Law, Athens, Georgia 1995, 241 pp.
18. C. Paulus, Changes in the Power Structure within the Family inthe Late Roman Repub-
lic, 70 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1503 (1995).
19. D. Johnston, Limiting Liability: Roman Law and the Civil Law Tradition, 70 Chicago-
Kent Law Review 1515 (1995).
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cretely, legislation defined the family while delimiting the rights and
obligations of its members. For the Roman paterfamilias, as well as
for his children, the law also had a broader significance; it provided
the common background and the language to reconcile personal pref-
erence with public necessity. In a society where the cult of the forefa-
thers was essential to the definition of everyone's identity, the Roman
paterfamilias's preference for testate succession revealed a deep-
seated concern for his after life as well as for the future of his family.
As C. Paulus shows, the last will and testament was a legal monument
which ultimately secured the prosperous fate of the family while pre-
serving forever the memory of the deceased.
A similar legal evolution may be observed outside the family do-
main in the area of contract and delict liability. Here, the legal doc-
trine defined a model of social and business relations adapted to the
requirements imposed by fundamental social and economic changes.
Over a period spanning several centuries, the Roman jurists intro-
duced the principle of limited liability which encompassed both the
contractual and delictual aspects of an individual's acts. What mat-
tered was the unfailing concern for a legal solution which was not only
acceptable to the parties but also would warrant the respect of public
policy. Contractual liability was initially limited to the parties bound
by the contract. This principle was revised in order to accommodate
new demands for the protection of their creditors' interests. This ex-
pansion to third party liability required precise limitations, which were
achieved by setting up financial as well as functional limitations. Fi-
nancial limitations were imposed in the matter of delictual liability,
based on a relation of status, as in the case of slaves and children in
power; the functional limitation was ignored in the law of delict. To
the contrary, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when Dutch
and French jurists adapted the principles of the Roman law to the
needs of their time, financial and functional limitations were reconsid-
ered in a different way. By then, the financial limitation seemed pref-
erable in the matter of contractual liability, while the functional
limitation provided a satisfactory mode of limiting liability in the law
of delict.
Since the time of the Twelve Tables, the legendary first promulga-
tion of Rome's unwritten laws, the country's fortune was closely asso-
ciated to the law. For centuries, Roman citizenship was a legal
privilege that symbolized a distinctive identity under the rule of the
1995]
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ius civile.20 Yet, by modem standards, statutory legislation was rather
scarce during the Republic. The pragmatic method of the praetor fa-
vored remedies over rights. As limited as it was, this legal corpus pro-
vided support for a much needed interpretation, a task that previously
had been the pontiffs' prerogative and later characterized the jurists'
role. Nevertheless, as P. Stein 2' notes, this intellectual movement and
its different schools failed to provide a comprehensive conception of
an organized legal system. The unique character of Roman jurispru-
dence was preserved in the late Justinian's compilations; in fact, the
bulk of this monumental work comprised an extensive collection of
the selected works of earlier Roman jurists.
By the beginning of the twelfth century, centuries after the col-
lapse of the Western Roman Empire, memories of its legal achieve-
ments had long disappeared. Therefore, the abrupt and still
unexplained revival of Roman law in Northern Italy prompted the
medieval jurists to reconsider the existing normative system which had
so far sustained few challenges. The problem that faced the first glos-
sators of the Roman law was to reconcile the Roman legal reason with
the feudal society and its distinctive political structure. Within one
century, medieval society witnessed significant changes which trans-
formed its traditional modes of representation. Religious and legal
ideas inspired a new self-consciousness among the social elite. In this
intellectual ambience, the legal science was perceived as a universal
knowledge that Paulus de Castro, a fifteenth-century jurist, would
later claim "was the noblest of all sciences since it made man bet-
ter."'22 In this process, the question of legal knowledge encompassed
human affairs as well as divine matters, as claimed in an excerpt from
the Roman jurisconsult Ulpian's work inserted in Justinian's Digest.
In Ulpian's Rome, this allusion to the divine things denoted a particu-
lar meaning; it comprised the administration and the regulation of the
Roman religion which constituted part of the public law. The advent
of Christianity gave it new meaning and the medieval faith confirmed
this evolution. 23 The ancient Roman distinction between natural law
20. Y. Thomas, Citoyens et Residents dans les Cites de 'Empire Romain. Essai sur le droit
d'origine, in Identitd et droit de l'autre, ed. L. Mayali, Studies in Comparative Legal History,
Berkeley 1994, pp 1-56.
21. P. Stein, Interpretation and Legal Reasoning in Roman Law, 70 Chicago-Kent Law Re-
view 1539 (1995).
22. Paulus de Castro, In Digestum vetus Commentaria, D.1.1.1., Iuri operam daturum, fol.
2rb, Venise 1593.
23. For further discussion of the dualism between divine law and human law, see E.
Cortese, Lex, Aequitas, Utrumque lus nella Prima Civilistica, in Lex et lustitia nell'Utrunque
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and civil law was interpreted accordingly. As an expression of God's
will, natural law was nothing but divine law, while civil law was a
human feat.
This combination of the spiritual and temporal orders was further
developed in the Church's own law. Here, the order of the different
normative sources reflected the preeminence of the spiritual world
over the temporal one. The conciliar canons and the papal legislation
came second to the Holy Scriptures and the works of the Church's
Fathers. This strict hierarchy in favor of the more religous texts did
not ignore the jurists' competence. R.H. Helmholz shows how all the
legal sources including the Bible were subjected to their interpretation
and comments. 24 The full development of the canon law from the mid-
dle of the twelfth century onward merged the Church's biblical tradi-
tion with the Roman legal legacy. In this process, Helmholz keenly
observes, the Bible was considered by the canonists as a fundamental
norm that warranted both the legitimacy and the authority of the legal
order. In doing so, the canonists were able to develop a particular
mode of legal reasoning which would eventually influence the secular
conception of the modern constitutional state.
The dualism of divine will and human feat also defined the funda-
mental relationship between justice and law.25 Since the Gregorian
Reform of the Chuch's institutions and discipline in the eleventh cen-
tury, the papacy had strongly stressed the exemplary value of justice
for the harmonious life of the Christian society. The study of the new
law and its enforcement could not be dissociated from the idea of jus-
tice. According to a twelfth-century jurist, "[Justice] is not the main
topic but the basis of law, indeed its very substance. '26 As noted by
Walter Ullmann, "the supreme criterion of all medieval considerations
in the field of the theoretical and practical jurisprudence was the reali-
zation and concrete manifestation of the idea of justice. '27 But the
development and implementation of a judicial model that could
achieve this goal required the creation of a new judicial procedure and
Ius: Radici Antiche e Prospettiva Attuali, Utrumque lus. Collectio Pontificiae Universitatis
Lateranensis, 20, Vatican 1989, p. 95119.
24. R.H. Helmholz, The Bible in the Service of Canon Law, 70 Chicago-Kent Law Review
1557 (1995).
25. Bulgarus, Materia Institutionum, "God is the authority of justice while man is the au-
thority of the law" cited by S. Kuttner, A Forgotten Definition of Justice, in The History ofIdeas
and Doctrines of Canon Law in the Middle Ages, London 1992, v, p. 78 n.17.
26. F. de Zulueta and P. Stein, The Teaching of Roman Law in England around 1200,
London Selden Society, Supplementary Series, vol. 8, 1990, p. 8.
27. W. Ullmann, The Medieval Idea of Law as Represented by Lucas de Penna, London
1946, p. 35.
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a judiciary system which differed from the traditional modes of con-
flict resolution. 28 During this process, a new form of public justice was
gradually substituted for private justice.29
As K. Fischer Drew observes, for centuries, the ruling powers had
granted local jurisdictional privileges in order to warrant the loyal
support of their allies. This political practice became prevalent in the
feudal society.30 Each local lord could thus exercise the power of jus-
tice that was attached to his fief. During the late Middle Ages, the
strengthening of a central authority in the hands of the ascending
monarchs was eventually achieved through the centralization of the
judicial system. The formation of the romano-canonical procedure 31
and the renown of the royal and ecclesiastical courts were the main
factors of this evolution. 32 By then, the role of the public authorities
in the administration of justice was much different than in the early
system of social conflict resolution that had replaced the Roman law
after the collapse of the empire in Western Europe.
In conclusion, it is important to remember, as J. Whitman does, 33
that this result was not the ultimate product of the evolution of a sub-
jective legal consciousness. From this perspective, the early develop-
ment of a uniform system of resolution of social violence in the so-
called archaic codes, which were in circulation in various societies dur-
ing a period of several thousands of years, was often viewed as the
first manifestation of the state authority. According to this well-estab-
lished interpretation, these codifications resulted in the progressive
control of private violence and its eventual eradication by the ruling
power. But, according to Whitman, this representation of the so-called
"self-help model" fails to provide a satisfactory account of regulation
involving monetary or mutilation penalties for bodily mutilation. His
probing of the "self-help model" raises several questions about the
historical development of state institutions. These archaic regulations
which were long forgotten in medieval Europe reflected a cultural
28. K.W. NOrr, Zur Stellung des Richters im Gelehrten Prozess der Frohzeit. Munich 1967,
104 pp.
29. For further discussion, see P. Stein. Legal Institutions: the Development of Dispute Set-
tlement. London 1984, 236 pp.
30. K. Fischer Drew, Public vs. Private Enforcement of the Law in the Early Middle Ages,
70 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1583 (1995).
31. L. Fowler-Magerl, Ordo iudiciorum vel ordo iudiciarius: Begriff und Literaturgattung,(lus Commune, Sonderhefte 19), Francfort am Main 1984, 341 pp.
32. On the development of appellate procedure, see the important study by A. Padoa Schi-
oppa, Ricerche sull'appello nel diritto intermedio, UniversitA di Milano, Publicazioni della
facoltA di Giurisprudenza, ser. 2, Studi di Storia del Diritto, n. 2, 4, Milan 1967.
33. J. Whitman, At the Origins of Law and the State: Supervision of Violence, Mutilation of
Bodies, or Setting of Prices?, 71 Chicago-Kent Law Review (forthcoming 1996).
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predicament in which private violence and public regulation coexisted
within the same social system. The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
belief in the civilizing value of the legal order as opposed to the ruth-
lessness of primitive society expressed undoubtedly a particular ideol-
ogy. But behind such a model and its interpretation, we can sense the
significance of the ancient legal tradition which was so influential in
the shaping of the modem Western legal culture and supplied the
foundations of the political reason.

